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Abstract
Climate-change vulnerability assessment has become a frequently employed tool, with the purpose of informing policy-
makers attempting to adapt to global change conditions. However, we suggest that there are three reasons to suspect that
vulnerability assessment often promises more certainty, and more useful results, than it can deliver. First, the complexity of the
system it purports to describe is greater than that described by other types of assessment. Second, it is difﬁcult, if not impossible,
to obtain data to test proposed interactions between different vulnerability drivers. Third, the time scale of analysis is too long
to be able to make robust projections about future adaptive capacity. We analyze the results from a stakeholder workshop in
a European vulnerability assessment, and ﬁnd evidence to support these arguments. To cite this article: A. Patt et al., C. R.
Geoscience 337 (2005).
 2004 Académie des sciences. Published by Elsevier SAS. All rights reserved.
Résumé
Traitement de l’incertitude dans les évaluations de la vulnérabilité au changement climatique. L’évaluation de la vulné-
rabilité au changement climatique est devenue un outil d’emploi fréquent pour informer les décideurs qui visent une adaptation
à des conditions climatiques changeantes. Cependant, nous suggérons qu’il existe trois raisons de soupçonner les études de
vulnérabilité de souvent promettre plus de certitudes et de résultats utiles qu’elles ne sont effectivement capables d’en produire.
Tout d’abord, la complexité du système qu’il s’agit de décrire est plus grande que celle qu est rencontrée dans d’autres types
d’évaluation. Deuxièmement, il est difﬁcile, si ce n’est impossible, d’obtenir des données permettant de tester les interactions
entre les divers déterminants de la vulnérabilité. Troisièmement, le temps sur lequel porte l’analyse est trop long pour que les
estimations de la capacité d’adaptation future soient robustes. Nous analysons les résultats d’un atelier des parties intéressées à
une évaluation de la vulnérabilité européenne et trouvons des éléments soutenant ces arguments. Nous suggérons que le niveau
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des incertitudes quant à la vulnérabilité au changement climatique est si grand qu’elles jettent un doute sur l’utilité de cette
approche. Pour citer cet article:A. Patt et al., C. R. Geoscience 337 (2005).
 2004 Académie des sciences. Published by Elsevier SAS. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) has, since its ﬁrst assessment report, assessed
not only the science behind climate change, but also
people’s exposures to its impacts, and the possibilities
for lessening the problem. Beginning with the Third
Assessment Report, the IPCC has also turned to as-
sessing future vulnerability to climate change [35].
The attention of the IPCC reﬂects numerous research
efforts underway attempting to assess the vulnerability
ofhuman–environmentsystems,nowandinthefuture,
in developing and developed countries, to anticipated
environmental changes, foremost among them global
climate change [23,32,43].
Scientiﬁc discovery has made it possible to pre-
dict several important changes in the biosphere over
the coming years, decades, and even centuries, which
could have major implications for human wellbe-
ing [52]. Many of these changes appear to be initiated
by particular human activities, while others, such as
decadal climate variability or the loss of coastal land,
appeartobedrivenbysomecombinationoffactorsan-
thropogenic and outside of human activity. Whatever
the causes of such changes, the ability of scientists
to predict them with some accuracy and reliability
creates the opportunity to improve decision-making,
both by private individuals and by government policy-
makers, in ways that take into account the direction
and magnitude of future changes [8,57]. Scientists can
project some of the long-term consequences of human
lifestyle patterns – the environmental impacts – in or-
der to help people make decisions that minimize their
harm to the environment [21,22]. But science can also
project long-term environmental changes, to encour-
age and assist people to adapt in advance [56]. Within
this latter vein of research, the concept of vulnerabil-
ity has taken on importance among the global change
research community [35].
Policy makers appear to be eager consumers of vul-
nerability assessments, and are ﬁnancing and purchas-
ing such assessments at a faster and faster pace; there
are currently hundreds of vulnerability studies under-
way in countries and regions around the globe, deliv-
ering a variety of information packages [63]. Some of
these focus on speciﬁc sectors of the economy (such as
transportation, or agriculture), and help policy-makers
within those sectors to better plan. Others engage in
drawing vulnerability maps: generating general indi-
cators of vulnerability, and comparing those indicators
across geographical areas and snapshots of time. It
is no surprise that such assessments are attractive to
policy-makers, as they offer the promise of helping
them substantially to improve their decision-making.
Policy-makers who visibly use such assessments, or at
least pay attention to them, can claim to be protecting
their constituents from the things that most threaten
them, to be making them less vulnerable, somehow
safer. For example, people living in ﬂood-prone areas
need to know how much additional ﬂooding to an-
ticipate, so that their ﬂood control measures will be
certain to be effective. On its face, the use of vulnera-
bility assessment to inform policy-making seems like
the perfect integration of knowledge and action, and a
necessary ingredient in fostering a transition to a more
sustainable future.
As with many types of assessment, however, the
issue of scientiﬁc uncertainty is prominent in the
climate-change vulnerability issue [18,65].I ti sw e l l
recognized that the inherent uncertainty in trying to
make projections for natural systems up to 100 years
in the future is difﬁcult, as uncertainties cascade upon
each other, even more so when translating natural sys-
tem changes to their effects on an uncertain social
system [19,38]. At the same time, it seems self evi-
dent that some information is better than none, and
even given the tremendous uncertainties in projections
of climate changeimpactsand vulnerability,these pro-
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even for events of low likelihood, modelers can say
with high conﬁdence the direction in which that like-
lihood is likely changing. While such messages can
often be confusing to policy-makers, once they under-
stand the information, their decision-making should
beneﬁt [40].
We suggest that in fact the uncertainties in climate-
change vulnerability may be far higher than several
closely related ﬁelds where assessment has proven
useful: vulnerability to natural hazards, vulnerabil-
ity to famine, and the economic impacts of climate
change. Although not immediately apparent, the com-
monly stated goals of climate-change vulnerability as-
sessment require modelers to understand the behavior
of far more complex systems, over much longer time
periods, with less applicable past data from which to
draw. We suggest that an assessment with little or no
useful information may be worse than no assessment
at all, and for this reason, some kinds of vulnerabil-
ity assessment may in fact be counterproductive.In the
following sections we develop this argument. First, we
examine different models of vulnerability, concluding
with the commonly used model of climate-change vul-
nerability. Second, we examine the difﬁculties in gen-
erating useful knowledge about future vulnerability,
combined with the potential drawbacks of communi-
cating that knowledge. Third, to ground our argument
inanempiricalstudy,weexaminetheinteractionswith
stakeholders in a recent vulnerability assessment, to
see whether they considered the results useful. Fourth,
we conclude with suggestions for appropriate, and
inappropriate, types of vulnerability assessment, and
guidelines for conducting good assessment in light of
high uncertainty.
2. Vulnerability and vulnerability assessment
The concept of vulnerability as something to be as-
sessed and then addressed has risen in recent years
within several different research and policy communi-
ties. It mirrors other policy relevant concepts that are
the subject of assessment and research, such as wel-
fare or wealth. Wealth can be assessed and compared
in several different ways, from simple exchange rate
equivalents, to purchasing power parity, to the qual-
ity of life and level of development, depending on
the question one ﬁnds most interesting. So too does
the vulnerability concept have several different mean-
ings, depending on the problem being described. In
this section, we brieﬂy examine some of those mean-
ings. Then, we examine several reasons why the use
of the vulnerability concept among the climate change
community presents major challenges for researchers.
2.1. Three areas of vulnerability assessment
The ﬁrst area of vulnerability research deals with
natural hazards, such as earthquakes, cyclones, or
ﬂoods. There is nothing to be done about the fact that
some places are naturally in harm’s way – San Fran-
cisco, Tokyo, Istanbul, and Islamabad are all more
likely to suffer an earthquake than New York, Lon-
don, or Beijing – but there are things to be done to
lessen the negative consequences of the harm. A city
can be less vulnerable to an earthquake if it imple-
ments a combination of technological (e.g., different
building materials), organizational (e.g., enforcement
of building codes), and other societal (e.g., public ed-
ucation programs) solutions that minimize the loss of
life and property associated with shaking ground. As-
sessing and addressing vulnerability to natural hazards
involves listing the many ways in which people will
suffer when a particular hazard hits, and identifying
and implementing measures to minimize each of these
consequences [10,11].
The second area of vulnerability research lies
within the famine relief community. Famine relief
workers are concerned less with a particular event
as with a particular outcome: the lack of access of a
large number of people to adequate supplies of food.
Early and important work showed that the most obvi-
ous causes of famine (e.g., drought, pestilence, and
war) are not the most important [50]. Entitlement
theory suggests that when a combination of social,
political, and economic factors is present, even the
most minor external shock can lead to mass starva-
tion [55]. Addressing and assessing vulnerability to
famine in this case involves listing the many possible
events that can trigger crisis, and identifying and im-
plementing measures to break this causal chain. Such
assessments have often led to the creation of famine
early warning systems, which currently exist in many
developing countries, and which monitor environmen-
tal and social indicators that often predict a growing
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The third type of vulnerability research lies within
the climate change impacts assessment community
[14]. As people ﬁrst recognized the existence of an-
thropogenic climate change, they began to consider
whether it would be worthwhile addressing it, the nat-
ural question was what the consequences of climate
change actually would be, and thus how much action
to prevent it would be justiﬁed and feasible. This ne-
cessitated the linking of climate models, which make
projections decades and centuries into the future, with
socio-economic and human settlement scenarios, ana-
lyzing what the natural forms of harm would be, and
who would be in harm’s way [15]. Integrated assess-
ment modeling of climate change impacts provided
information to guide decisions about how much to
abate greenhouse gas emissions, based on cost esti-
mates of the damages avoided [42]. While impact as-
sessment often required assumptions about the future
capacity of people to adapt, its purpose was not ex-
plicitly to guide those choices [36]. By the late 1990s,
however, the concept of adaptation rose on the cli-
mate change agenda, as people recognized that some
amount of climate change, perhaps a large amount,
was inevitable [35]. The focus of impact assessment
shifted from the effort of justifying a global policy re-
sponse to reduce the causes of climate change, to one
of minimizing the negative consequences given par-
ticular mitigation, and hence climate, scenarios [53].
Assessing and addressing climate-change vulnerabil-
ity means listing the many possible natural events –
chronic and acute – that climate change may create in
a given place, listing the many possible ways in which
people in this place may suffer as a consequence of
these events, and identifying and implementing mea-
suresto break the connectionbetweenthe list of events
and the list of forms of harm [20,23,60]. Climate-
change vulnerability assessment covers a wide spec-
trum, in terms of the range of impacts and potential
adaptations considered. In its narrowest form, it ex-
amines a single decision or set of decisions to be made
today, such as changes to long-lasting infrastructure or
settlement patterns, and sees how sensitive that deci-
sion is to projected impacts of climate change [19,26].
In its broad form, it allows for comparison of the over-
all vulnerability of different communities or economic
sectorstotheaggregateimpactsofclimatechange,and
the identiﬁcation of options to improve future adaptive
capacity [25,53].
Fig. 1 illustrates the variables considered in each
of these areas of vulnerability assessment. In the nat-
ural hazards model, there is a single triggering event,
a number of control variables, and a number of neg-
ative outcomes. To some extent, there is a correspon-
dence between each control variable (which may be a
set of factors) and each negative consequence, such as
building design inﬂuencing the likelihood of collapse
when an earthquake hits. In the famine model, there
are a number of triggering events, a number of con-
Fig. 1. Three models of vulnerability.
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trol variables, and a single negative outcome. Again,
there is some correspondence between the two groups,
such as drought combined with the lack of irrigation.
Of course, since the triggering events may happen in
isolation or in combination, there is not an exact corre-
spondence. A war, for example, might make the early
warning system ineffective, unless some other control
variable, such as the presence of strong international
organizations, is present.
In the climate change model, there are typically
a number of triggering events, a number of control
variables, and a number of consequences, many of
them negative. It is rare that one can point to a sin-
gle impact interacting with a single control variable
to produce a single negative outcome, since it is to
be expected that many or all of the triggering events
will happen simultaneously and interactively. In its
narrow form – examining a single set of decisions to
be made today – climate-change vulnerability assess-
ment restricts the number of variables considered, and
hence interactions, to a manageable amount. In the
broad form – considering the net vulnerability of a
community or economic sector – the potential set of
interactions mushrooms. For lack of adequate theory
about these interactions, many researchers are forced
to consider only linear connections and one-to-one
correspondences between variables, qualifying their
ﬁndings accordingly [1,33,41,51].
2.2. Validating vulnerability models
Vulnerability assessment ought to help decision
makers to minimize the magnitude or likelihood of the
negative consequences, given the occurrence of one
or more of the triggering events, by inﬂuencing one
or more of the control variables. But before doing so,
they need to be conﬁdent that the consequences of the
intervention will be as the model suggests: that the
change in the control variable will reduce, rather than
exacerbate,theharm.Togainsuchconﬁdence,itisim-
portant for modelers to validate their work with past
data.
There have been a lot of earthquakes, ﬁres, ﬂoods,
and cyclones. In each case, there has been a distinct set
of other factors present, the control variables, which
may have contributed to the damage, as well as differ-
ent sets of damages. Importantly, these events are typ-
ically separated by a large amount of time and space;
whensuch a separation doesnot exist,such as between
an earthquake and its aftershocks, one typically treats
them as a single event. Even where one place has ex-
perienced several hazards, the duration of the hazard,
combined with the time to rebuild from it, is typi-
callyshortincomparisontotheintervalbetweenthem:
a city may experience one earthquake, it rebuilds, and
then years later it experiences another. Because of this
separation, each of these events can be treated as an in-
dependent observation. Famines are a little more difﬁ-
cult to separate in time and space, given that they cross
borders easily, and take years to wax and wane. But it
is still possible to parse out numerous distinct events,
and examine the relationship between causes and ef-
fects. With many independent observations, one can
begin to test models rigorously, and make meaningful
statements about the relationships between causes and
effects.
In human history there have been many examples
of quite extreme local and regional climate change
leading to the prospering or collapse of societies [6].
There have also been several major shifts on global
weather patterns, such as the Little Ice Age of the
1700s and 1800s, or the Medieval Warm Event. How-
ever, there have been no major changes in global cli-
mate in which any of the hypothesized control vari-
ables, such as income equality or access to credit, have
been in a state anything like they are now or will be
in the future. To be sure, the sub-components of the
climate-change vulnerability model – models of cli-
mate, socio-economic development, and adaptation –
can be validated. However, there is no way to deter-
mine whether the various factors, the combination of
triggering events and the multiple control variables,
will interact in the way that is forecasted.
For hazards and famine researchers, the presence
of data has made it possible to make statements that
go beyond the obvious, and indeed to present the kind
of counter-intuitive results that actually allow science
to contribute value to policy. It is important to know,
for example, that most of the damages to human life
and property from cyclones occur not as a result of
wind, but of ﬂooding [17]. It is important to know that
most people under-insure against natural hazards, un-
til immediately after an event, when they over-insure,
unless government policies force them to do other-
wise [27]. It is important to know that good gover-
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quate rainfall [55]. Each of these lessons suggest that
some forms of public investment are better than others
in reducing future vulnerability, and hence can con-
tribute to the policy process by justifying costly op-
tions. Statements about social system/natural system
interactions that produce more or less vulnerability to
climate change are much harder to make.
2.3. The time frame of analysis
Policy makers concerned about natural hazards
worry about the event that could occur at any time:
tomorrow, next year, and within the coming decades.
Assessing the vulnerability to those natural hazards
means examining the system, as it exists today, and
suggesting changes to that system in order to make
it less prone to damage. To be sure, those changes
may take years, or even decades to implement. Of-
ten the changes involve altering the type of building
construction, or the location of settlements; all new
construction will take the hazard into account, while
existing infrastructure simply ages, hopefully grace-
fully. But the starting point for the changes is the
system’s current design. Planning for food security is
not too different, although it does often require some
consideration of the trends that may be making peo-
ple in a given place more vulnerable to famine, such
as population growth, or the loss of arable land. The
analysis begins with the recognition that vulnerability
exists today, vulnerability that will not disappear on its
ownandmayindeedbegrowing,andwiththedesireto
make active interventions to reduce the vulnerability.
Climate-change vulnerability assessment, at least
in its broad form of considering the aggregate vulnera-
bility of a community or economic sector, is different.
The starting point for analysis is the recognition that
triggering events may emerge, grow more frequent, or
become greater in magnitude over time as a result of
changes in greenhouse gas concentrations. These may
include changes in average temperature, in average
precipitation, in average sea level, or in the frequency
and magnitude of extreme events [34,44]. Indeed, of-
ten scientists are able to say with high conﬁdence that
a low probability event will become more likely [35].
It is no surprise that the ranges of uncertainty within
impact assessments are, or ought to be, very wide [16,
39,65]. While the use of multiple scenarios can often
offer insight into what the future may look like, and al-
low for the development of robust strategies [30,59],i t
doesnotovercomethecorechallengeofunpredictabil-
ity that the time dimension offers.
Vulnerability assessment is in many ways simi-
lar to environmental impact assessment, in that it re-
quires projections of future environmental changes [9,
46], but in terms of the time dimension of action,
there is a crucial difference. Impact assessment guides
those mitigation decisions that will potentially create
or avoid a negative environmental impact, and like the
steps taken in response to famine and hazards assess-
ment, can be taken today, before the problem devel-
ops [53].I nFig. 2, the square representing present-day
mitigation is the decision to be informed by impact
assessment, in that the decision-maker can choose be-
tween at least two pathways. At some future time, the
environmental change will manifest itself, and there is
no doubt some uncertainty about how society will suf-
fer harm: under one decision pathway, society could
suffer harm ranging from a to b; under another deci-
Fig. 2. Impact and vulnerability assessment.
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sion pathway, society could suffer harm ranging from
c to d. The point is to decide which initial pathway
to select. Vulnerability assessment, by contrast, guides
those decisions that will respond to the threat of an
impact, whatever the causes of that impact may be.
In Fig. 2, the vulnerability assessment assumes one or
more scenarios of mitigation and other important so-
cietal changes, which bifurcate at the left-hand circle.
For each scenario, then, the assessment examines the
range of potential adaptation decisions, and the conse-
quences of each. For one scenario, the consequences
could range from w to x, and for the other scenario,
from y to z.
A commonly expressed goal for climate-change
vulnerability assessment is to examine the adaptation
options of people to climate change ﬁfty or one hun-
dred years from now, when climate change will be
more severe, and suggest steps that can be taken now
to enhance the range of options in the future. Features
of the system that do not respond quickly to climate,
such as the population or level of economic develop-
ment,maypartlydeterminethefuturerange.Butmany
of the important variables, such as the location of new
infrastructure, are the elements of the system that are
the most adaptive to change, and the least easy to pre-
dict. For example, a coastal community may adapt to
gradual sea level rise by locating new development
further inland, by constructing dikes and seawalls, or
some combination of the two. Yet the decision that
starts the adaptation trend in one direction may be as
small as a single factory owner deciding to locate next
to the sea or on higher ground, which in turn will inﬂu-
encewheretheemployeeschoosetolive,whichinturn
will inﬂuence new road construction. Adaptations cas-
cade upon themselves. While vulnerability assessment
might suggest no-regrets options, it becomes very dif-
ﬁcult to say with any conﬁdence whether a costly
change made today is justiﬁed in terms of improving
adaptive capacity in the future.
When it tries to inform present day policy makers
how to improve future adaptive capacity, vulnerability
assessment enters the territory of needing to predict
the future behavior of a complex adaptive system [29,
31]. Under conditions of increasing returns to scale,
such as where the desirability of a product increases
along with its market share, the choices of society to
adopt particular technologies are entirely path depen-
dent, and virtually impossible to predict [2,62]. Agent-
basedmodelingcanbe usedto demonstratethatpartic-
ular systems are complex adaptive, and to understand
why a particular complex adaptive system evolved as
it did, and thereby explain surprises that have been ob-
served [3,5,12,28]. The technique, by looking at the
structure of agent networks, can also begin to explain
the rate at which a system evolves, and hence begins
to look quite different [4]. But neither agent based
modeling, network analysis, nor any other method of
system modeling can predict, at any quantiﬁed level
of uncertainty, how the adaptive elements of a system
will evolve once it does begin to enter the range of the
unfamiliar [7].
2.4. Costs and beneﬁts of vulnerability assessment
While narrowly framed vulnerability assessments
can improve the quality of some long-range invest-
ment decisions, the uncertainties inherent in the
broader type of climate-change vulnerability assess-
ment may preclude their ability to suggest more than
no-regrets options. At the same time, there are likely
other collateral beneﬁts to these assessments, such as
advancing the state of the art in integrated modeling,
and in promoting stakeholder dialogue. Perhaps these
beneﬁts justify conducting vulnerability assessments,
even when the intended beneﬁts are limited or non-
existent. We suggest not, for two reasons.
First, there may well be some other type of assess-
ment that is more useful, which is being crowded out
by the vulnerability assessment. Such an effect was
documented in the effort to assess the costs and ben-
eﬁts of reduced sulfur dioxide emissions in Europe
during the 1980s [47,48]. During the early years of
the Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LR-
TAP) regime, there was a great interest in using cost-
beneﬁt analysis to set targets for sulfur dioxide emis-
sions reductions. The ﬁrst major study was completed
in 1981, and focused on the beneﬁts to building mate-
rials, crops, lake ﬁshing, and human health [45].B e -
cause of the uncertainties, primarily in valuing health
beneﬁts, the estimated beneﬁts of the favored reduc-
tion target ranged from $1.83 billion and $16.63.
Policy-makers found the results unhelpful, but de-
cided to fund additional work at beneﬁts estimation.
Over the next nine years, numerous reports attempted
to estimate beneﬁts, and yet none was able to re-
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to use the results [24,54,61]. Eventually, due to po-
litical pressure, LRTAP policy-makers gave up try-
ing to assess the beneﬁts of acid rain reduction, and
decided to focus on what was possible, namely as-
sessing a least cost pathway for achieving ecosystem
protection. Within four years, modeling teams in the
United Kingdom, Sweden, and Austria had developed
integrated assessment models that could achieve this.
One of them, the RAINS model, contributed signiﬁ-
cantly to the development and adoption of a protocol
to reduce sulfur emissions unevenly throughout the
continent, a major policy breakthrough [47]. Interest-
ingly, by the late 1990s the effort to assess beneﬁts
was renewed, born out of the success at assessing acid
rain impacts. But when assessment teams turned to
what they could achieve, and generated credible re-
sults, they had a much greater impact on the policy
process.
Second, governments rely on scientiﬁc results to le-
gitimate their policy decisions [13]. When the actual
content of the scientiﬁc information is small, this en-
hancementoflegitimacymaybeinappropriate.Forex-
ample, it seems increasingly clear that millions of peo-
pleindevelopingcountriesaretodayworseoff,andin-
deed hundreds of thousands of people may have died,
becauseofinternationalﬁnanceanddevelopmentpoli-
cies, which in turn were based on questionable eco-
nomic theory. Yet even as these policies started to
be produce negative results, governments continued to
engage in them, based on a belief in the underlying
theory; the belief in the theory’s rightness persisted in
blindinganalyststo contradictoryevidence[58]. Other
researchers have shown that such cases can lead to a
backlash against using scientiﬁc information to inform
decision-making in that particular context, often as a
result of the scientiﬁc results being overstated by one
or more policy actors [66].
3. Evidence from stakeholder dialogue
In the last section, we developed the argument
that climate-change vulnerability assessment’s contri-
bution to the policy process lies not in identifying the
best ways of reducing future vulnerability, but rather
in stimulating a social discourse where impacts can
be discussed and no-regrets strategies explored. In this
section, we consider the outcome of a particular vul-
nerability assessment, in terms of the lessons that the
stakeholders in that assessment considered valuable.
The results are consistent with the argument we have
made so far.
3.1. The ATEAM project
The Advanced Terrestrial Ecosystem Analysis and
Modeling (ATEAM) project was a 3.9 million € Eu-
ropean Union funded research and assessment project,
led by the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Re-
search (PIK) in coordination with seventeen partner
institutions, the goal of which was to assess the vul-
nerability of human systems in relation to changing
provision of terrestrial ecosystem services in Europe
over the coming hundred years. The ATEAM project,
conducted from 2001 to 2004, was ambitious in that
it combined stakeholder analysis with state-of-the-art
ecosystem modeling and innovative techniques of an-
alyzing macro-economic indicators.
First, the researchers would meet with stakehold-
ers, representatives from various environmentally sen-
sitive sectors of the economy across Europe, to deter-
mine what ecosystem services they considered to be
most valuable, such as growth rates of particular tree
species, suitability of land for particular crop varieties,
snow reliability, or quantiﬁable storage of carbon.
Their incentives to participate ranged from inﬂuenc-
ing the research agenda to focus on the changes they
viewed most important, networking with their col-
leagues, to obtaining valuable information they might
not otherwise learn.
Second, the various modeling teams projected how
these ecosystem services might change over time, as a
result of climate change, changes in nitrogen deposi-
tion, land use change, and changes in other natural and
socio-economic drivers. To help to standardize their
projections, all of the modeling teams incorporated
European downscaled projections from four of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES) pro-
jections. These were meant to capture a likely range
of plausible future global development paths, in terms
of changes in overall economic growth, population,
international trade, and prioritization of different lev-
els of environmentally friendly industrial patterns.
None of the SRES scenarios included speciﬁc mea-
sures to address climate change through mitigation,A. Patt et al. / C. R. Geoscience 337 (2005) 411–424 419
the intentional reduction of greenhouse gas emis-
sions, although they do differ in the rate of emis-
sions due to other factors. To further standardize
their results, all of the ATEAM modeling teams ap-
plied multiple scenarios based on the downscaled
projections from four leading general circulation mod-
els.
Third, the results of the different ecosystem model-
ing teams were combined into a single mapping tool, a
software package that allows a computer user to com-
pare the exposure and sensitivity of particular ecosys-
tem services, and the vulnerability of speciﬁc sec-
tors across Europe at different times. Development of
the vulnerability maps started with a consideration of
whattheglobalchangeimpactscouldbeoverthecom-
ing century, and how this would affect the maximum
possible production of each speciﬁed ecosystem ser-
vice. The maps then included an estimate of what the
actual utilization, or demand for, each ecosystem ser-
vice might be over that same time frame. Sensitivity,
then, depended in part on the likelihood of the actual
utilization exceeding the maximum possible provision
of a particular ecosystem service. Finally, the maps
included a consideration of the adaptive capacity, de-
rivedfrom a broad slate ofeconomicand social indica-
tors, such as per capita income, access to information,
and age structure of the society. The researchers over-
laid national scale adaptive capacity projections onto
the potential impact projections. The results were then
mapped, in terms of a range of colors, across Europe
in 10  × 10  grid cells. Fig. 3 shows one example of
such a map.
Fourth, the project team engaged in additional
stakeholder dialogue: a total of three general work-
shops,threesectoralworkshops,andmultipleinformal
interactions. The last general workshop took place
near the end of the project and after the development
of the prototype mapping tool; the ATEAM project
partners met with the group of stakeholders for two
days, to present their ﬁndings, and to gain feedback
on the usefulness of their information package in or-
der to improve future vulnerability assessments. The
results of this stakeholder meeting are what we now
consider.
Fig. 3. Example of an ATEAM vulnerability map (from [37]).
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3.2. Stakeholder responses to vulnerability maps
On the 3rd and 4th of May, 2004, thirteen stake-
holders met with ﬁfteen members of the ATEAM
project in the Maxx Steigenberger Hotel in Potsdam,
Germany, ﬁrst to review the results and second to
provide feedback on them. Of those attending, three
represented the forestry sector (in Germany, Finland,
and Spain, respectively), two represented the moun-
tain tourism sector, one represented the agricultural
sector in Europe, one represented the bio-energy sec-
tor in Sweden, and the remainder represented govern-
ment agencies (e.g., the German Federal Environmen-
tal Agency),non-governmentalorganizations(e.g., the
Climate Action Network), or the media concerned
with climate change in general. While we do not at-
tempt to summarize the entire workshop, we do de-
scribe three trends that we observed in the meeting.
First, the stakeholders participated actively and in-
telligently in the discussion. During the ﬁrst half of the
workshop, the presentation of the modeling methods
and the vulnerability maps, every stakeholder asked
at least one question, and at times the presentation
evolved into protracted discussions of the ﬁner points.
On presentation of the model of carbon storage, for
example, the Swedish bio-energy representative led
discussion in the direction of considering the most
effective ways for converting plant growth into car-
bon sinks, along with the difﬁculties in carbon stock
accounting. The discussion was on two main points:
how to model the carbon cycle taking into considera-
tion temporary stocks, and how to combine alternative
ways to reach carbon emission targets, such as the
substitutionofmaterialswhichneedhighcarbonemis-
sions to manufacture them as opposed to wood. On
this and many other points, the stakeholders took an
active role in discussing ﬁner points with the ATEAM
partners.
Second, the stakeholders all agreed that the im-
pact assessment component of the vulnerability maps,
in terms of examining changes in the potential pro-
duction of ecosystem services, was useful and inter-
esting. The representative from the Spanish forestry
industry, for example, noted that several species of
pine currently being grown are already showing signs
of stress due to insufﬁcient water, and that the im-
pact assessment part of the modeling revealed that this
stress would increase, not decrease, over the next hun-
dred years. To her this suggested that the time has
already come to stop planting these species, although
she recognized that to achieve change in forest com-
position would take more than scientiﬁc information.
The representative from the German forestry industry
noted a similar conclusion, and stated that these con-
clusions could be most useful in arguing for changes
in German forestry regulation, which currently dic-
tates which species of forest owners may plant. To him
the impact suggested a means of arguing, to the gov-
ernment, for greater forest owner ﬂexibility to plant a
wider variety of species. The representative from the
German environmental agency noted that some areas
of her country already seem ill suited to their tradi-
tional crops, and the impact assessments show this
trend increasing in the future. Again, this could form
the basis for a change in regulatory or crop subsidy
policy.
Third, the stakeholders agreed that the maps of
vulnerability, including information such as adaptive
capacity and projected land use, were less helpful.
The representative of the European farmers said that
while he found the impact maps useful, he found
less value in the inclusion of adaptive capacity over
the next hundred years, since this did not and could
not guide his decision-making. In general, participants
said that the vulnerability maps failed to capture the
multi-dimensionality of their sectors. The representa-
tiveoftheFinnishforestrysector,forexample,pointed
out that the people who own most of the commercial
forests in Finland actually gain less than 20% of their
income from the forests; they are people who work
full time jobs, or are engaged in agriculture, and who
use the harvesting of timber from their land merely
to supplement their income. Their and their children’s
vulnerabilityto global change lies not in the sensitivity
of their forests to anticipated changes in temperature
and precipitation – although such changes are help-
ful to know – but rather to the overall development of
the Finnish economy, including the other sectors of the
economy in which they are engaged. To speak of the
anticipated impacts of global changes on their land is
important, but translating this into useful information
about their vulnerability requires making inappropri-
ate assumptions about their lives and the sources of
their livelihoods. The representative of the German
forestry sector suggested that the vulnerability maps
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subsidy policies to beneﬁt his sector, but even then it
would be more helpful to offer data about current dif-
ﬁculties, rather than difﬁculties projected ﬁfty or one
hundred years in the future.
3.3. Lessons learned
Asanecdotalevidence,theresultsfromtheATEAM
stakeholder workshop are consistent with the argu-
ments of this paper. While policy-makers in the Eu-
ropean Union may have been eager to fund a vulnera-
bility assessment, and while ATEAM appears to have
met their expectations, the actual usefulness of the as-
sessment in directly inﬂuencing decision-makers was
far more limited.
The impact assessment part of the ATEAM mod-
eling work was found to be useful, and represented a
major step forward in modeling skill and the ability to
predict future global change impacts. It is important
not to understate the difﬁculty of this work. Assessing
impacts within ATEAM required downscaling numer-
ous climate models, according to standardized scenar-
ios, developing consistent land use scenarios, and cou-
plingtheseresultswithsectorspeciﬁcecosystemmod-
els. The impact projections generated within ATEAM
were state of the art, both in their ﬁne scale and their
sector speciﬁcity. There is still a great deal of progress
to be made in projecting impacts of global change that
people care about, at a spatial and temporal scale that
is useful for making different decisions. Likewise the
social-scienceprojectionswithin ATEAMwere innov-
ative, involving state of the art means of tying together
different national indicators in a way that could rep-
resent adaptive capacity. However, the results of this
modeling appear, at least so far, to be of more acad-
emic than practical interest.
The stakeholders themselves recognized the limita-
tions of any attempt to translate projections of impacts
into statements about sectoral vulnerability. First,
making the system being considered more complex
made the results more difﬁcult to communicate and
interpret, or required making unreasonable assump-
tions. Second, there was less conﬁdence in the results
generated from these more complex models. Third,
the inclusion of adaptive capacity simply showed that
making necessary changes would be more difﬁcult – it
did not inﬂuence in any way what those changes actu-
ally should be. Overall stakeholders repeatedly asked
for a more transparent and targeted communication of
the results and the methods used to obtain them. Only
then they would be able to really decide whether the
scientiﬁc results were of relevance to their activities.
Obviously, this workshop represents a small sam-
ple of stakeholders, responding to a single effort to
assess vulnerability. They show that in this case, what
has been perhaps the most complex effort yet to assess
regional global change vulnerability, the most useful
contribution of scientists lay in the impact assessment
embedded in a process of stakeholder dialogue. Stake-
holders were eager to talk with scientists about adap-
tive capacity and vulnerability, but they could not fore-
see how they could use the information to make deci-
sions differently. We have searched for and failed to
ﬁnd any examples of other vulnerability assessments
achieving more.
4. Discussion
Vulnerability assessment is a tool to assist the de-
velopment of the best policies, the ones that reduce
the likelihood of harm, while promoting other changes
in society that people value. In the case of natural
hazards, it is possible to model the vulnerability of a
system to a particular hazard, to validate that model
against past data, and to use the results of the model to
suggest policies that will make the system less vulner-
able, or more resilient, to the possible occurrence of
the hazard. Likewise, it is possible to model the vul-
nerability of a country or region to food insecurity,
again to validate that model using case studies from
past famines, and to suggest innovative policies that
address the root causes of hunger. Finally, in the case
of climate impact assessment, it is possible to arrive
at predictions of future impacts of emissions choices
made today, and in so doing assist policy makers de-
cide how much to mitigate.
Climate-change vulnerability is different, for three
reasons. First, the complexity of the system is greater,
in terms of requiring consideration of multiple trigger-
ing events, control variables, and forms of harm. Mod-
eling the connections between these multiple factors
may be exceedingly difﬁcult. Second, there is no way
to validate the integrative models, and test whether the
various pieces of the system interact in the way that
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made with conﬁdence. Third, climate-change vulner-
ability assessment requires projecting possible states
of a complex adaptive system far into the future, with
enoughaccuracytodifferentiatebetweentheeffective-
ness of competing present policy options.
Vulnerability assessment can lead to the identiﬁca-
tion of no-regrets solutions to enhance future adaptive
capacity, but it is rare that it can provide the justi-
ﬁcation for undertaking costly measures. Given this
limitation, we suggest that it can be an unfortunate dis-
traction. Vulnerability, like risk, is a powerful word,
and evokes strong emotions. Nobody likes to feel vul-
nerable, and policy-makers can use the promise of
reducing vulnerability as a strong argument for imple-
menting particular policies. To use a current example,
leaders in several nations have justiﬁed the act of in-
vading a sovereign nation by claiming that doing so
would reduce their peoples’ vulnerability to terrorism.
Maps of vulnerability convey a sense of certainty, and
could cause people to take actions they might other-
wise not have. No-regrets options should be evaluated
on their more certain payoffs, not simply because peo-
ple believe they will generate signiﬁcant future ben-
eﬁts through the reduction of vulnerability; it would
be a shame to see an assessment divert policy agen-
dasandactionsawayfrom otherprogramswithproven
trackrecordsorprovablesuccess,basedonprojections
of future vulnerability, when those projections must be
inherently suspect.
Given the uncertainties inherent in the exercise, is
there a future for climate-change vulnerability assess-
ment? We suggest that there is, and that it is in a form
that resembles risk analysis quite closely. First, sci-
entists can adequately perform the narrower form of
climate-change vulnerability assessment, examining a
single decision or set of decisions. By narrowing the
system that is being assessed from a complex adap-
tive system to one that is relatively simple, such as
a building or an infrastructure project, scientists can
begin to make statements with a greater degree of con-
ﬁdence. Second, scientists can engage in the broader
form of vulnerability assessments, but should often
present their results in a less aggregated format. They
should avoid the temptation to combine predictions
of future climate change impacts with socio-economic
scenarios and estimates of adaptive capacity. Instead,
they should focus on the risks that a given community,
as it exists today, faces from predicted changes in the
future.
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